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A STATISTICAL STUDY OF OCCUPATIONS OF
JURORS IN A UNITED 'STATES
DISTRICT COURT
By Edwin S. Mills*
I. INTRODUCTION

The criteria which should be employed in the selection
in the selection of jurors for Federal Courts have been the
subject of discussion, debate and several Supreme Court
decisions. Specifically, the Supreme Court has reversed the
findings of lower courts when total exclusion in the selections of jurors on the basis of race,' sex 2 or economic
status8 has been shown. The court has not, however, made
a precise statement as to the validity of selection procedures which involve distortion or discrimination, but not
total exclusion, based on economic class and occupation.
It is clear that a person is not legally entitled to a particular jury provided the method of selection is such that a
representative cross section of the eligible population is
chosen. This does not, however, provide a precise statement of the tolerable limits of distortion. The purpose of
this statistical study is to pose the question of the legality
of a selection procedure which leads to substantial and
systematic distortion, but not exclusion, in the occupational
distribution of jurors. It reports a statistical analysis of
occupations of a large sample of jurors in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland. These tabulations
formed the basis of a "challenge to the Array" in a recent
case in that court.4
The author is not a student of the law and is not competent to judge the legal issues raised by the evidence presented herein. Brief reference will, however, be made to
Supreme Court decisions in order to focus attention on the
relation between this study and widely known opinions of
* Associate Professor of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, B.A.
1951 Brown University; Ph.D. 1956, University of Birmington (England).
1
Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
8
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
United States of America v. Commercial Savings and Loan Association,
Inc., No. 24653 Criminal (1961). The motion was overruled by the trial
Judge, Hon. R. Dorsey Watkins. The trial ended in a hung jury. The
tabulation presented belbw is somewhat more extensive than that entered in the motion to challenge the array, since It includes jurors from
lists which became available only after the date of the trial.
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the Court. The two cases to which this study relates most
closely
are Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.5 and Fay v. New
6
York.
In the Thiel case the issue was the use of a specific
economic criterion in the selection of jurors for the District
Court. The clerk and the jury commissioner in the trial
court had testified that they deliberately excluded daily
wage earners in the selection of prospective jurors on the
grounds that, if called, wage earners would usually be
excused by the Court because of the financial sacrifice
which jury service would entail. The Supreme Court ruled
that this was an unjustified exclusion and that the trial
court should have granted the petitioner's motion to strike
the panel.
The Fay case concerned a much more subtle form of
economic discrimination and is the Supreme Court decision
most closely related to the study presented in this article.
The defendants contended that laborers, operatives, craftsmen, foremen and service workers were systematically
and unconstitutionally excluded from the panel of special
jurors in the New York County Clerk's office, from which
the trial jury had been chosen. 7 The principal evidence
presented to substantiate this contention was a classification by the defendant's attorney of more than 2700 jurors
from this panel into about two dozen occupations. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics conformed this classification
into Census categories, but was unable to classify 165
names and was unsure as to the Census category of 21
others. Although not presented in evidence, the Census
classification of occupations of the experienced labor force
in Manhatten was presented by the Court in its decision
and compared with the classification of jurors. This comparison showed wide discrepancies between the occupational distribution of jurors and that of the Manhatten
labor force. For example, proprietors, managers and
officials constituted 43.0% of the jurors and 9.3% of the
Manhatten labor force. Most of the discrepancies in the
tabulation presented in the Fay case were in the same
direction and of similar orders of magnitude as those presented below in this study.
However, the Court did not find this comparison to be
persuasive evidence that the jury panel was improperly
5Supra, n. 3.

6 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
7Defendants
also contended that women were similarly excluded, but
no comparison was presented, between their numbers on the jury lists and
the total eligible population.
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constituted. The decision includes several specific criticisms of the comparison. (1) Some of the categories in
the original tabulation presented by the defendant showed
industry rather than occupation. Since there is no unique
relationship between industry and occupation, the confirmation with the Census occupational classification is
therefore somewhat unsure. (2) The extent to which
members of the Manhatten labor force were not eligible
for jury service was not analyzed and hence not shown to
be unrelated to occupation. The Court discussed a number of factors which might make members of the labor
force ineligible for jury service. For example, jurors must
be at least twenty-one years of age whereas the labor
force includes some who are as young as fourteen. Furthermore, much larger percentages of some occupations (such
as operatives and laborers) are under twenty-one than of
other occupations (such as professionals). There is also
reason to believe that eligibility on the basis of citizenship, literacy and property ownership (when relevant)
affects occupations unequally. (3) In several statements
the Court hints, but does not develop the argument, that
the comparison would not demonstrate discrimination conclusively even if the deficiencies under (1) and (2) were
corrected, because it is not necessary or possible that any
particular jury provide proportionate representation of all
groups in the eligible population, but only that the method
of selection be such that juries are fairly drawn from a
cross section of the community. This suggests the reasonable inference that, in order to establish unjustifiable discrimination, it is necessary to show not only lack of proportionality between major economic groups, but also
that the selection procedure systematically discriminates
against certain groups or classes. This can be translated
into the statistician's language by saying that it is necessary to show that the lack of proportionality could not
plausibly have resulted from a procedure which gave the
same chance of being selected to eligible members of all
economic groups. No such demonstration was presented
in the Fay case. Whether or not the Court had this in
mind, this is a valid point and should be taken into account in a careful study of occupational representations
on jury panels.
It is not possible to say that the Court would have
ruled the jury unconstitutional in the Fay case had these
deficiencies not been present in the evidence. Certainly,
the decision contains other arguments, which are inde-
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pendent of the deficiencies discussed above, against the
defendant's petition. One further fact of relevance in
judging the Court's opinion is that the Fay case was concerned with jury selection in a state court, in which the
Supreme Court's only right of supervision is through the
due process clause of the 14th amendment. The present
study is concerned with jury selection in a Federal Court,
in which the Supreme Court's supervisory power gives
it more latitude in judging policy with respect to jury
selection. It is impressive that, in spite of this and the
deficiencies in the evidence presented in the Fay case, four
members of the Court (Justices Murphy, Black, Douglas
and Rutledge) argued in dissent that the "blue ribbon"
character of the jury constituted grounds for reversal.,
II.

STATISTICAL RESULTS

The comparison of the occupations of a sample of jurors
with those of the eligible labor force, presented in this
article, follows the same general procedure as that presented in the Fay case, except that the three deficiencies
described above are not present.
The first step was to classify jurors into the occupational categories employed by the Bureau of the Census.
The sample used for this purpose was the names of all
grand, petit, special and excused jurors in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland from December
1958 to December 1961. This sample contained 2,047
names of which 276 were housewives and 195 were retired.
Since these groups are not in the labor force they had to
be removed before the comparison could be made. The
author attempted to classify the remaining names into the
ten Census occupational categories. The basic information available for this purpose was the statement of occupation required by the Court of all jurors. In some cases this
information was supplemented by the use of telephone
and other directories in order to ascertain the industry
in which the juror was employed, if this was relevant to
the occupational classification. There were sixty-one jurors
whose occupational category could not be established with
reasonable certainty. Hence, deleting the housewives,
retired and unclassifiable leaves 1,515 jurors, 75% of the
original lists, who were classified in this study.
8332 U.S.

261, 296 (1947).
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The following are the ten Census occupational categories together with examples of typical occupations in
each category:
Occupational Occupational
Code
Category

Typical Occupations

3

Professional
Technical
Farmers
Managers, Officials
Proprietors
Clerical

accountants, doctors, engineers,
scientists, teachers
farm owners and managers
corporate officers, retail proprietors, industrial managers
mail carriers, stenographers, bank
tellers, ticket agents

4

Sales workers

5

Craftsmen, Foremen

6

Operatives

7

Service workers

8
9

Farm laborers
Laborers

real estate and insurance agents,
retail sales clerks
carpenters, mechanics, plumbers,
tailors
deliverymen, semi-skilled factory
workers
domestic servants, waiters, policemen, watchmen
farm foremen, farm wage workers
longshoremen, garage laborers, unskilled factory workers

0

1
2

The second major step was to estimate the numbers in
each of the labor force occupational categories who are
eligible for jury service. The basic data used were the
detailed occupational data for the Baltimore Standard
Metropolitan Area (BSMA) from the 1950 Census. Two
points should be made concerning these data. First, the
District of Maryland includes the entire State of Maryland and not merely BSMA. However, about 95% of the
jurors on the lists come from BSMA. Hence, the Census
data for that area are relevant rather than those for the
entire state. The error introduced because a few jurors
are chosen from outside BSMA is negligible except in the
case of farmers and farm workers, and these groups are
numerically unimportant on the jury lists. Second, the
Census data refer to 1950, where as the jury lists refer to
the years almost a decade later. This is a defect which
could not be adequately corrected. However, the following
11950 Census of the Population, VoI. II, Characteristics of the Population, Part 20, Maryland.
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is relevant. The occupational distribution of the BSMA
labor force was quite similar to that for the country as a
whole in 1950. Furthermore, the Census provides estimates of shifts in the occupational distribution of the labor force for the country as a whole between census years.
It is clear that the calculations presented below are affected negligibly if, as is reasonable to assume, changes in
the occupational distribution in BSMA from 1950 to 1958
were similar to the changes for the country as a whole.
There are three conditions of eligibility for jury duty
which may be related to occupation and for which the
Census data should therefore be adjusted. These are age,
literacy and citizenship.'0 Persons must be at least twentyone years of age to be eligible for jury duty whereas the
labor force statistics include some as young as fourteen.
However, the Census presents occupational data by age
and it is therefore possible to eliminate from each occupational category those under twenty-one. Illiteracy presents a somewhat more difficult problem and only an
approximate adjustment can be made for this factor.
Illiteracy data are not available by occupation from the
Census on a regional basis, but the Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes illiteracy rates by occupation for the
country as a whole." As should be expected, illiteracy
rates vary greatly by occupation, from less than 0.05% in
category 0 to 11.5% in category 8. Provided the relative
proportions of illiterates in various occupations in the
BSMA are not very different from the proportions for the
country as a whole, this adjustment will be accurate. It
is unlikely that BSMA differs greatly from the average
for the country as a whole in this respect. There are no
data pertaining to the occupations of non-citizens. However, for BSMA, less than two percent of the population
are aliens. Even if, as is unlikely, aliens were very unevenly distributed among occupations, the adjustment required would still be small and the results of the study
would be affected to only a minor extent. In summary, of
the three adjustments which should be made to the labor
force data, one can be made exactly, one approximately,
and one not at all. However, it is not hard to calculate the
largest distortion which could result from the inability to
make exact adjustments and these maximum distortions
are insufficient to affect the results in a substantial way.
'0 28 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (1950).
U U.S. Department of Commerce,
Current Population Reports, Labor
Force Series P. 50, No. 49, October 1953.
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The results of the study are presented in the following
table.
OCCUPATIONS OF JURORS AND ELIGIBLE LABOR FORCE

(3)

()(2)

(4),

Census Occupational Number
d Title

% of Classified
Jurors in this
Occupation

aof Eligible
Labor Force
in this
Occupation

0 Professional,

16.7

9.2

182

.00000

2.4
33.5

0.7
9.5

343
353

.00000
.00000

10.4
13.1
10.3

13.9
7.2
17.6

75
182
59

.00003
.00000
.00000

7.1
4.3

20.2
13.2

35
33

.00000
.00000

0.1

0.5

20

.02026

2.0

8.0

25

.00000

Column (1)
as % of
Column (02)

Probability
(rounded to 5
Decimal Places)

Technical

1 Farmers
2 Managers,
Officials,
Proprietors

3 Clerical
4 Sales
5 Craftsmen,
Foremen

6 Operatives
7 Service
Workers
8 Farm
Workers

9 Laborers

Column (1) shows the percentage of the 1,515 classified
jurors in each of the ten census occupational groups.
Column (2) shows the percentage of the eligible labor
force in each occupational group. Column (3) is 100 times
the ratio of column (1) to column (2). An entry of 100 in
column (3) means that the percentage of jurors in that
occupation is the same as the percentage of the eligible
labor force in that occupation. An entry greater than 100
means that the occupation is more heavily represented in
the juries than in the eligible labor force. 200, for example, means that the percentage of jurors in that occupation
is twice the percentage of the eligible labor force in that
occupation. An entry less than 100 means that the occupation is less heavily represented on the juries than in the
eligible labor force. The number 50, for example, means
that the percentage of jurors in the occupation is half the
percentage of the eligible labor force in that occupation.
Column (4) shows the probability that a degree of over or
under representation at least as great as that observed in
column (3) might result if jurors were chosen in such a
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way as to give the same chance of being chosen to eligible
members of each occupation. Very small probabilities,
such as those presented in the table, indicate that it is
virtually impossible for a selection procedure which gives
members of all occupations the same chance of being
chosen to result in as much misrepresentation as is actually observed. These probabilities form the basis of the
statistician's test of the hypothesis that the selection procedure assigns equal chances of being selected to eligible
members of all occupational groups. When the calculated
probability is less than some level, 2 chosen in advance,
the statistician concludes that the hypothesis is false, i.e.,
that the selection procedure assigns a large probability of
being chosen to eligible members of those occupations
which are overrepresented and a small probability to
eligible members of underrepresented occupations. In
column (4), all the probabilities except one are so small
that any competent statistician would reject the hypothesis
that members of all eligible occupations have the same
chance of being selected." The evidence amounts to a
virtual proof that the selection procedure assigns a greater
probability of being selected to eligible members of the
overrepresented occupations than to eligible members of
underrepresented occupations. The one exception is group
8, farm laborers. Even though this is the most underrepresented of all the occupational groups, the numbers in
this group, both in the eligible labor force and on the
juries, are so small that the result is not statistically very
significant (i.e., the probability in column (4) is not as
small as in the other occupations).
As can be seen from the table, the overrepresentation
on the jury lists occurs mostly in the professional, managerial and sales occupations. 4 Underrepresentation occurs mostly among the craftsmen, operatives, service
workers and laborers. Groups 0 and 2 together constitute
less than 20% of the eligible labor force, but just over
50% of the classified jurors. Groups 5-9 together constitute
59% of the eligible labor force, but only 24% of the classified jurors. Groups 3 and 4 are a middle group and between
"This number is called the "significance" level. The most commonly
used significance levels in scientific work are .05 and .01. The probabilities
in column (4) are calculated from standard tables of the binumial, lpoisson
and normal distributions.
13A test, called chi-square, can be made for the table as a whole rather
than for each occupation separately. This test confirms the finding
stated in the text.
1 Farmers and farm laborers are ignored in this paragraph because
they are an insignificant part of the eligible labor force.
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them represent about 21% of the eligible labor force and
23% of the classified jurors. These findings are broadly
consistent with the tabulation presented in the Fay case.
They establish two conclusions beyond reasonable doubt.
First, there is no total exclusion of any major occupational
group in the procedure by which these jurors were chosen.
Second, there is a large and systematic bias in the selection procedure which gives a much greater chance of
being selected for jury service to eligible members of the
professional and managerial groups than to craftsmen,
operatives, service workers and laborers.
In evaluating methods of jury selection, it is important
to analyze not only the resulting juries, as has been done
above, but also the mechanism by which they were selected. To this end I have studied carefully the extensive
testimony presented by the jury commissioner and the
Clerk of the Court in the motion to challenge the array in
the Commercial case. During this testimony they described
in detail the methods and sources they used to select
jurors in the District Court. Basically, there are two such
sources. First, names of prospective jurors are solicited
from a wide variety of individuals and organizations such
as public officials in counties and cities; corporations, including especially public utilities; civic, social and business
organizations such as Kiwanis and Rotary Clubs, Masonic
Lodges and Chambers of Commerce; religious bodies and
clergymen; labor unions; newspapers. Second, names were
drawn directly from residence and telephone directories.
Both the Clerk and the jury commissioner testified that
they tried to select a representative cross section of the
eligible population and that they did not choose names
on the basis of occupation or economic class. However,
it is almost inevitable that these procedures should lead
to large biases in the directions found in the above table,
regardless of how conscientiously the attempt is made to
obtain a representative cross section. In the first place,
most of the above sources already contain biases in the
directions found in the table. In the second place, it is
notoriously difficult to select randomly when there is any
chance that the "human element" can affect the samples.
There are many classical examples in the statistics textbooks in which people's conscientious and honest attempts
to choose randomly have resulted in very biased samples. Statisticians usually try to design sampling procedures so as to be completely free of subjective human
influences.
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III. CONCLUSIONS

The legal issues raised by this study must be judged by
others. Conclusions shall be restricted to a narrower issue.
As stated above, the author believes that biases in the
directions observed in this study almost inevitably result
when human judgment affects the selection procedure.
Furthermore, sampling procedures clearly could be devised, in consultation with competent statisticians, which
would eliminate the gross biases in the current procedures.
During the last twenty years an extensive literature has
appeared on the statistical design of sample survey techniques. 15 These techniques are now widely used by public and private agencies for the purpose of sampling from
large populations. Specialists in this field are associated
with the U.S. Bureau of the Census, with many universities
and with public and private survey research organizations.
It should be feasible to design automatic sampling procedures which, though imperfect, would eliminate the
gross misrepresentations which result under present
methods of jury selection.
'BThe most comprehensive publication on this subject is N. H. Hansen,
W. N. Hurwitz and W. G. Madow, Sample Survey Methods and Theory
(2 Vol., Wiley 1953, 1956). A much less technical survey of the subject is
presented in Chapter 15 of W. A. Wallis and H. V. Roberts, Statistics:
A New Approach (The Free Press, 1956).

